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Abstract	The	paper	looks	at	challenges	related	to	the	ideas	of	integration	and	knowledge	
systems	in	extra-academic	transdisciplinarity	(TD).	Philosophers	of	science	are	only	starting	paying	attention	to	the	increasingly	common	practice	of	introducing	extra-academic	perspectives	or	engaging	extra-academic	parties	in	academic	knowledge	production.	So	far	the	rather	scant	philosophical	discussion	on	the	subject	has	mainly	concentrated	on	the	question	whether	such	engagement	is	beneficial	in	science	or	not.	Meanwhile,	there	is	quite	a	large	and	growing	literature	on	extra-academic	TD,	mostly	authored	by	non-philosophers,	seeking	to	develop	TD	research	practices.	We	examine	this	literature	in	the	light	of	recent	discussions	in	pluralist	philosophies	of	science.	Some	philosophical	pluralists	see	the	increase	of	extra-academic	collaboration	and	participation	in	science	as	a	potentially	positive	development.	However,	certain	views	promoted	in	the	non-philosophical	literature	on	extra-academic	TD	appear	problematic	in	the	light	of	the	pluralistic	discussions.	For	instance,	the	literature	on	TD	appears	to	be	overly	optimistic	with	regard	to	integration,	and	the	notion	of	knowledge	systems	used	in	it	is	problematic.	We	believe	it	would	be	worthwhile	for	scientific	pluralists	sympathetic	to	the	aims	of	TD	to	look	more	closely	into	the	complex	settings	in	which	extra-academic	collaboration	and	participation	happens	in	actual	TD	projects,	and	to	offer	constructive	criticisms,	exploiting	insights	developed	within	pluralist	philosophy	of	science.			
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1.	Introduction	This	paper	looks	at	two	bodies	of	literature	in	relation	to	one	another.	Both	discuss	extra-academic	participation	in	academic	research,	but	thus	far	these	literatures	have	proceeded	independently	within	different	disciplinary	frameworks.	One	deals	with	extra-academic	transdisciplinarity	and	is	mostly	authored	by	non-philosophers,	while	the	other	consists	of	work	by	some	
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philosophers	on	scientific	pluralism.	We	propose	bringing	the	two	bodies	of	literature	in	contact	with	one	another.		Of	the	TD	literature,	we	have	chosen	handbooks,	programmatic	articles,	and	empirical	case	studies,	and	identify	two	issues	–	the	possibility	of	integration	and	the	idea	of	knowledge	systems	–	for	more	detailed	analysis	and	elaboration.	We	critically	consider	this	literature	and	these	issues	in	the	light	of	arguments	developed	in	the	pluralist	literature,	focusing	on	questions	related	to	the	epistemic	assessment	of	TD	projects.	Of	the	pluralist	literature,	we	concentrate	on	the	work	of	two	philosophers,	Philip	Kitcher	and	Alison	Wylie,	who	have	offered	explicit	accounts	that	touch	on	the	role	of	extra-academic	perspectives	in	science	(we	occasionally	consulting	others	too,	such	as	Helen	Longino,	Jeroen	Van	Bouwel,	and	Sandra	Mitchell).	We	suggest	that	pluralist	philosophies	would	benefit	from	paying	more	attention	to	the	actual,	evolving	TD	research	practices.	It	would	be	worthwhile	for	philosophers	of	science	to	take	notice	of	the	diverse	settings	in	which	extra-academic	participation	happens	in	actual	TD	projects	–	of	which	empirical	case	studies	of	TD	projects	may	be	informative.	It	appears	these	literatures	can	learn	from	one	another.	The	idea	of	engaging	extra-academic	parties	in	academic	knowledge	production	is	part	of	the	new	rhetoric	of	relevance	in	research	policy.	It	is	no	longer	just	an	idea	or	mere	rhetoric	–	it	is	becoming	an	important	practice	as	extra-academic	agents	are	being	given	various	roles	in	shaping,	producing	and	applying	research.	The	perceptions	of	this	trend	vary	from	viewing	it,	at	one	extreme,	as	a	panacea	that	will	re-establish	the	societal	relevance	of	science,	to	considering	it,	at	the	other	extreme,	a	“tyranny	of	participation”	(Cooke	and	Kothari	2001)	that	leads	to	unjust	exercise	of	power,	or	threatens	to	corrode	the	traditional	ideals	of	scientific	rigour	and	objectivity	(Boghossian	2006).	Extra-academic	participation	is	especially	well	established	in	transdisciplinary	research	that	attempts	to	tackle	complex	real-life	problems	by	integrating	inputs	from	many	different	sources.	The	incorporation	of	extra-academic	values,	interests,	and	knowledge	in	research	is	seen	by	many	as	a	necessary	step	in	the	development	of	academic	research	if	it	is	to	be	of	help	in	meeting	such	multifaceted	challenges	as	climate	change	and	global	poverty,	innovation	and	competitiveness.	There	is	now	a	strong	normative	urge	to	develop	more	practically	relevant	and	socially	inclusive	research	practices.	Powerful	agencies	of	research	policy	and	research	funding,	both	within	and	outside	of	universities,	increasingly	favour	broadly	collaborative	and	participatory	practices	that	engage	extra-academic	parties	such	as	businesses,	local	communities,	NGOs	and	indigenous	people.	There	is	a	vast	and	rapidly	growing	literature	on	extra-academic	transdisciplinarity	(TD),	mostly	produced	by	non-philosophers.	Some	of	this	literature	is	self-reflective	as	the	authors	may	themselves	seek	to	conduct	
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transdisciplinary	research.1	These	reflections	often	build	on	systems	theory	and	a	“Mode-2”	concept	of	knowledge	production,	but	also	on	other	approaches	such	as	the	idea	of	“postcolonial”	research	(Nowotny,	Scott	&	Gibbons	2001,	Hirsch	Hadorn	&	al.	2008,	Pohl	2008,	Zierhofer	and	Burger	2007).	However,	no	generally	accepted	definition	of	extra-academic	TD	has	been	settled.	Some	of	the	basic	notions	used	in	the	debates	over	these	issues,	such	as	integration	and	
knowledge	system,	remain	as	yet	equivocal.	Most	of	the	literature	that	seeks	to	address	conceptual	and	normative	issues	related	to	transdisciplinarity	is	primarily	programmatic,	envisioning	needs	and	outlining	vague	guidelines	for	this	kind	of	research.	On	the	other	hand,	there	are	many	empirical	case	studies	on	transdisciplinary	projects	–	often	focusing	on	their	difficulties	and	failures	–	but	these	typically	say	little	or	nothing	about	the	conceptual	and	normative	issues.	One	would	expect	philosophical	investigation	to	be	helpful	in	filling	in	these	gaps.	Turning	then	to	the	second	body	of	literature,	that	in	philosophy	of	science,	we	can	first	note	that,	for	the	most	part,	scientific	pluralists	concentrate	on	intra-academic	issues.	We	hasten	to	add	that	some	of	their	attention	has	also	been	attracted	by	issues	of	extra-academic	collaboration	and	participation.	Several	pluralists	hold	rather	favourable	attitudes	towards		attempts	to	democratise	scientific	knowledge	production	by	introducing	collaborative	and	participatory	approaches.	We	focus	on	two	different	paths	through	which	pluralist	arguments	may	lead	to	the	defence	of	extra-academic	agents	influencing	scientific	knowledge	production,	or	even	taking	part	in	it.	One	of	them	derives	from	Philip	Kitcher’s	(2001,	2011)	account	of	the	role	of	science	in	a	democratic	society	in	which	he	endorses		a	view	that	can	be	interpreted	as	a	defence	of	limited	extra-academic	participation	in	science.	His	arguments	are	related	to	a	broader	discussion	about	upgrading	the	possible	contributions	by	lay	people	to	research,	suggesting	that	lay	people	may	be	stakeholders	who	should	have	their	voice	heard	especially	in	policy-relevant	research,	or	can	be	considered	well-informed	experts	on	issues	that	researchers	wish	to	study	(Van	Bouwel	2009,	Fehr	and	Plaisance	2010,	Solomon	2009).	Another	related	endorsement	of	extra-academic	collaboration	and	participation	stems	from	feminist	philosophy	of	science	and	feminist	social	epistemology.	Drawing	on	this	source,	Alison	Wylie	(2015)	has	recently	offered	a	pluralist	argument	according	to	which	extra-academic	communities	may	be	able	to	offer	epistemically	important	criticism	from	their	unique	standpoint.	There	is	an	obvious	gap	in	the	pluralist	literature:	in	contrast	to	the	non-philosophical	literature	on	extra-academic	TD,	scientific	pluralists	in	philosophy	have	not	yet	paid	much	attention	to	actual	TD	practices.	The	arguments	Kitcher																																																									1	Note	that	what	we	call	‘extra-academic	transdisciplinarity’	is	often	called	just	‘transdisciplinarity’	in	this	literature.	Our	choice	manifests	the	idea	that	there	are	interesting	versions	of	intra-academic	transdisciplinarity,	too.	
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and	Wylie	offer	are	not	aimed	at	tackling	problems	that	arise	when	scientists	work	together	with	extra-academic	agents.	They	also	proceed	from	a	relatively	limited	idea	of	the	setting	in	which	such	collaboration	or	participation	occurs.	All	this	results	in	a	rather	narrowly	focused	examination	of	extra-academic	participation,	leaving	many	hot	issues	in	the	shadows.	It	will	be	useful	to	consult	the	non-philosophical	literature	in	bringing	those	issues	under	the	spotlight.	On	the	other	hand,	there	are	other	ongoing	discussions	on	pluralism	that	–	even	though	not	directly	addressing	TD	issues	–	could	be	relevant	for	the	scrutiny	of	extra-academic	TD.	We	will	examine	the	recent	debates	on	the	possibility	of	integration,	and	the	ongoing	discussion	on	what	we	call	the	pluralistic	version	of	
the	demarcation	problem.	We	argue	that	arguments	presented	in	these	discussions	can	be	applied	to	issues	that	are	central	in	the	TD	literature:	the	ideas	of	integration	and	knowledge	systems.	We	also	note	that	by	paying	more	attention	to	actual	TD	research	scientific	pluralists	could	positively	contribute	to	the	development	of	the	evolving	research	practices.	We	start	with	a	sketchy	portrayal	of	extra-academic	transdisciplinarity	in	comparison	to	the	two	pluralist	views	on	extra-academic	participation	we	selected	for	consideration.	Then	we	focus	on	two	sets	of	issues	about	integration:	one	is	about	the	integration	of	social	values	with	scientific	values;	the	other	is	about	the	integration	of	diverse	scientific	approaches.	In	TD	projects	these	two	are	seen	as	inseparable	parts	of	one	and	the	same	process,	whereas	in	pluralist	accounts	they	are	generally	treated	separately.	Then	we	add	extra-academic	knowledge	to	the	picture,	and	analyse	specific	ways	in	which	the	integration	of	academic	knowledge	and	extra-academic	knowledge	may	fail	because	of	unresolvable	epistemic	conflicts.	Here	we	introduce	the	problematic	notion	of	
knowledge	systems	used	in	the	TD	literature,	and	suggest	how	some	ideas	developed	in	pluralist	philosophies	of	science	can	be	fruitfully	used	to	analyse	situations	of	epistemic	conflict	in	extra-academic	TD.		
2.	Transdisciplinary	and	pluralist	views	on	extra-academic	participation	The	growing	demand	for	extra-academic	transdisciplinarity	is	part	of	the	ongoing	process	of	intensifying	science-society	relations	whereby	science	is	expected	to	be	of	more	direct	and	swift	relevance	to	the	rest	of	society.	The	key	idea	is	jointly	manifested	by	the	two	components	of	the	label	–	‘transdisciplinarity’	and	‘extra-academic’.	No	single	discipline	alone	is	able	to	meet	the	expectations	of	practical	relevance,	nor	are	academic	disciplines	by	themselves,	whatever	their	mutual	configurations.	Several	academic	disciplines	together	with	extra-academic	contributors	are	required.	Extra-academic	transdisciplinarity	is	called	to	solve	problems	and	to	meet	challenges	that	are	too	complex	for	any	one	academic	discipline	to	tackle	and	that	are	not	defined	within	any	monodisciplinary	frames.	The	problems	and	
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challenges	are	typically	not	identified	in	disciplinary	terms	by	disciplinary	communities	–	they	may	not	be	recognized	as	urgent	research	problems	within	the	prevailing	frameworks	of	disciplinary	research.	The	problems	and	challenges	are	rather	identified	as	such	--	as	problems	and	challenges	--	worth	attention	and	solution,	in	non-disciplinary	terms,	and	this	happens	in	large	part	by	extra-academic	agents	such	as	political	and	administrative	authorities,	businesses,	NGOs,	and	local	communities.	These	are	also	among	the	extra-academic	agents	that	are	supposed	to	contribute	to	the	solutions	of	the	problems.	Some	of	the	challenges	are	global,	such	as	biodiversity	loss,	climate	change	and	global	poverty,	while	others	are	more	local	or	regional,	such	as	urban	and	landscape	design,	improvement	of	health	care	and	sustainable	development	of	tourism	(Brown	&	al.	2010,	Hirsch	Hadorn	&	al	2008,	Hirsch	Hadorn,	Pohl	and	Bammer	2010,	Leavy	2011,	Russell,	Wickson	and	Carey	2008,	Zierhofer	and	Burger	2007,	Mobjörk	2010).	Different	interests	and	values	that	are	at	stake	in	a	TD	project	are	often	accompanied	by	different	viewpoints,	conceptualizations,	explanations	and	representations.	This	is	so	especially	in	the	case	of	so	called	"wicked	problems",	that	is,	problems	that	are	very	complex	and	difficult,	and	perceived	very	differently	by	the	various	groups	they	touch.	Different	disciplines	interpret	the	problem	in	their	own	ways,	and	including	the	extra-academic	communities	to	whom	it	is	a	problem	only	widens	the	array	of	potentially	conflicting	interpretations.	Transdisciplinary	research	is	seen	as	a	way	to	create	a	shared,	multifaceted	understanding	of	the	wicked	problem,	and	thus	to	be	likely	to	arrive	at	the	best	available	solution	(Brown	et	al.	2010).	The	idea	of	integrating	knowledge	from	different	sources	in	order	to	offer	solutions	to	pressing	societal	or	environmental	problems	has	been	articulated	in	terms	of	systems	theory	and	the	“Mode-2”	concept	of	knowledge	production	(Hirsch	Hadorn	et	al.	2008,	Gibbons	et	al.	1994,	Nowotny,	Scott	&	Gibbons	2001).	The	problem	fields	are	seen	as	complex	systems,	parts	of	which	are	studied	by	academic	disciplines	and	approaches.	An	adequate	understanding	of	a	particular	problem	at	hand,	and	the	development	of	a	solution,	require	the	collaboration	of	researchers	representing	different	theories	and	approaches	in	a	solution-oriented	research	project.	TD	has	been	strongly	influenced	also	by	contemporary	ideas	about	the	proper	relationship	between	academic	researchers	and	the	public,	suggesting	a	normative	urge	to	develop	more	socially	inclusive	research	practices.	Not	only	academic	researchers,	but	also	extra-academic	agents	may	have	valuable	perspectives	and	knowledge	related	to	the	problem	at	hand,	or	they	may	be	in	a	position	to	highlight	some	important	aspects	of	it.	When	a	research	project	aims	at	producing	policy-relevant	knowledge	and	offering	solutions	to	pressing	real-life	problems,	it	is	now	often	considered	that	the	people	or	interest	groups	whose	lives	the	problem	touches	should	take	actively	
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part	in	the	whole	research	process	to	ensure	that	their	viewpoints	and	interests	are	taken	into	account.	The	available	definitions	of	transdisciplinarity	are	not	uniform	(see	e.g.	Carew	and	Wickson	2010,	Pohl	2011,	619-620).	They	cite	multiple	attributes,	but	rely	on	different	subsets	of	these.	The	definitions	can	be	organized	as	a	series	with	an	expanding	set	of	attributes	cited,	and	a	shrinking	scope	implied,	so	that	the	more	numerous	the	attributes	cited	in	a	definition,	the	fewer	instances	there	are	that	satisfy	the	definition.	Splitting	a	little	further	than	is	usual	in	the	literature	gives	us	the	following	list	of	attributes:	1.	Transcending	scientific	disciplines	and/or	approaches	within	academia	2.	Integrating	academic	disciplines	and/or	approaches	with	one	another	3.	Addressing	and	attempting	to	solve	socially	and	practically	relevant	issues	4.	Involvement	of	extra-academic	agents	in	various	roles			5.	Involvement	of	extra-academic	knowledges	6.	Involvement	of	extra-academic	values	and	interests	7.	Integrating	academic	and	extra-academic	knowledges	and	values	8.	Serving	the	common	good	(or	some	such	idea	of	a	normative	goal)	We	will	consider	these	attributes	in	relation	to	the	arguments	regarding	extra-academic	collaboration	or	participation	in	science	presented	by	Kitcher	and	Wylie.	First	a	few	words	about	scientific	pluralism	in	general.	Scientific	pluralism	is	a	normative	principle	or	statement	about	plurality	in	science.	Pluralism	either	justifies	the	actually	obtaining	(kind	and	degree	of)	plurality	or	recommends	that	there	be	(higher-than-actual	degrees	or	other-than-actual	kinds	of)	plurality	in	science	(Mäki	1997).	Pluralism	is	always	pluralism	about	some	item	X,	and	the	value	of	X	can	range	widely,	from	reality	and	truth	to	belief	and	knowledge,	from	theories	and	models	to	methods	and	methodological	principles,	from	explanations	and	sources	of	data	to	research	styles	and	strategies,	from	questions	and	interests	to	goals	and	values,	from	institutions	and	organisations	to	agents	and	informants	of	inquiry,	and	so	on.	This	range	of	items	gives	rise	to	a	variety	of	types	of	pluralism.	Further	sub-types	are	based	on	the	sorts	of	reason	one	cites	in	support	of	pluralism	about	some	item	–	such	as	the	importance	of	pursuing	a	comprehensive	account	of	a	complex	phenomenon	by	combining	a	multiplicity	of	models;	and	the	usefulness	of	employing	multiple	perspectives	in	error	elimination	(ibid.).	Other	dimensions	include	ideas	about	how	such	multiple	items	are	related	to	one	another.	Among	these,	of	relevance	here	are	insulation:	the	items	exist	in	separation	from	each	other,	they	co-exist	without	consequential	contact;	interaction:	the	items	interact,	perhaps	cross-fertilize	or	cross-check	one	another;	and	integration:	the	items	are	
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being	integrated	into	relatively	coherent	systems	(cf.	Chang	2012:269,	Van	Bouwel	2015,	Wylie	2015).	And	finally,	another	relevant	dimension	ranges	from	
intra-academic	(including	intradisciplinary	and	interdisciplinary	items)	to	extra-
academic	(encompassing	a	diverse	variety	of	items,	from	business	interests	to	indigenous	knowledge	systems,	and	so	on).		We	can	now	pick	out	and	list	those	ideas	that	are	relevant	for	our	purposes.	Pluralist	philosophies	of	science	can	then	be	seen	as	endorsing	permutations	of	such	elements.	a.	Plurality	of	epistemic	items	(theories,	explanations,	data	etc)	b.	Plurality	of	pragmatic	items	directing	research	(questions,	problems,	goals,	values,	interests,	etc)			c.	Plurality	of	methodological	items	(methods,	styles	of	inquiry,	standards	of	quality,	etc)	d.	Plurality	of	agents	of	inquiry	e.	Plurality	of	intra-academic	items	a-d	f.	Plurality	of	extra-academic	items	a-d	g.	Plurality	of	items	in	mutually	tolerant	insulation	h.	Plurality	of	items	in	mutual	interaction	i.	Plurality	of	items	integrated	with	one	another		Pluralist	philosophers	of	science	mostly	concentrate	on	a,	b,	c,	and/or	d	of	the	intra-academic	kind	(e).	Our	focus	here	however	is	on	two	versions	of	scientific	pluralism	that	defend	the	incorporation	of	extra-academic	items	(f)	into	academic	research.	There	are,	as	noted,	at	least	two	paths	through	which	a	pluralist	stance	may	lead	to	the	argument	that	extra-academic	participation,	or	the	integration	of	extra-academic	viewpoints,	is	a	good	thing	in	science,	a	recommendable	line	in	organising	research.	Along	the	first	path,	extra-academic	parties	serve	as	stakeholders	who	bring	in	goals	and	values	and	interests	that	guide	problem-setting,	subsequent	research,	and	the	use	of	its	results.	In	other	words,	they	serve	to	fix	the	pragmatic	context	of	any	particular	piece	of	inquiry;	and	there	is	a	plurality	of	such	contexts.	This	connects	with	pluralism	in	an	obvious	manner.	Any	piece	of	knowledge	is	pragmatically	constrained	in	that	it	serves	one	set	of	purposes	rather	than	some	other	set.	The	epistemic	goods	produced	by	different	scientific	approaches	may	be	well	suited	for	different	purposes	(see	Longino	2013;	Kellert,	Longino	and	Waters	2006).	Thus	differences	between	diverse	approaches	can	be	based	on	differences	in	their	(typically	implicit)	values	regarding	desirable	tasks	and	goals:	each	emphasises	the	importance	of	the	particular	purposes	for	which	it	is	best	suited,	so	plurality	is	justified	(Kitcher	2011,	36).		
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Insofar	as	academic	research	is	taken	to	have	the	responsibility	for	producing	knowledge	for	the	use	of	the	rest	of	society,	researchers	should	not,	just	by	themselves,	decide	which	approaches	should	be	funded	and	advanced,	and	when,	and	which	purposes	thus	served.	Philip	Kitcher	has	defended	the	view	(combining	b,	e,	f	and	i)	that	scientific	values	should	be	integrated	with	social	values	in	a	process	where	it	is	decided	case-by-case	which	pragmatic	purposes	research	should	serve	(Kitcher	2001,	2011,	see	also	Van	Bouwel	2009,	Cartieri	and	Potochnik	2014,	Douglas	2007).	Kitcher’s	rather	weak	pluralism	stresses	the	importance	of	taking	heed	of	extra-academic	interests	and	perspectives	in	giving	direction	to	research,	thereby	endorsing	more	broadly	democratic	ways	of	setting	the	agenda	of	knowledge	production	within	academia	(without	however	subjecting	intra-academic	epistemic	and	methodological	items	to	democratic	determination).	As	Mark	Brown	(2004,	2013)	has	noted,	it	is	somewhat	ambiguous	whether	Kitcher	actually	suggests	the	involvement	of	extra-academic	agents	(d)	in	scientific	knowledge	production	or	not.	Kitcher	(2011)	himself	describes	his	account	as	an	attempt	to	chart	ways	in	which	scientific	expertise	can	be	integrated	with	democratic	values	(i).	This	path	is	in	accordance	with	attributes	3,	6	and	8	(and	maybe	4)	concerning	TD	that	we	listed	above.	The	second	path	from	pluralism	to	extra-academic	participation	suggests	engaging	extra-academic	partners	as	knowledgeable	experts	or	epistemically	useful	critics,	not	just	holders	of	values	and	interests.	As	Stephanie	Solomon	(2009)	stresses,	the	role	of	extra-academic	agents	as	stakeholders	is	very	different	from	that	of	experts.	Lay	people	can	be	well	informed	experts	on	an	issue	that	researchers	wish	to	study.	Moreover,	they	might	be	able	to	offer	epistemically	important	criticism	from	their	unique	standpoint.	Alison	Wylie’s	(2015)	recent	analysis	of	the	potential	epistemic	advantages	of	collaborative	practices	and	the	use	of	indigenous	knowledge	in	archaeology,	combines	these	two	ideas.	The	latter	idea	is	implied	by	the	view	that	several	pluralists	hold,	namely	that	allowing	for	a	variety	of	critical	viewpoints	and	approaches	is	beneficial	in	science	(e.g.	Longino	1990,	2002a,	Kitcher	1993,	Wylie	2015).	Among	them,	Wylie	has	explicitly	extended	this	beyond	intra-academic	positions,	arguing	that	extra-academic	approaches	to	a	given	issue	may	also	be	epistemically	useful.	Compared	to	Kitcher's	view,	Wylie's	is	more	inclusive,	as	she	welcomes	not	only	interests	and	values	(b),	but	also	epistemic	(a)	and	methodological	(c)	contributions	from	extra-academic	agents	(d).	However,	unlike	Kitcher,	she	is	content	with	interaction	(h),	so	does	not	entertain	the	greater	ambitions	of	integration	(i).	This	second	path	is	in	accordance	with	attributes	4	and	5	in	the	TD	list.	So	at	least	some	philosophical	advocates	of	scientific	pluralism	explicitly	favour	some	idea	of	extra-academic	participation	in	academic	research.	The	main	questions	in	the	philosophers’	discussion	deal	with	the	reasons	why,	and	the	ways	in	which,	the	extra-academic	agents	could	and	should	take	part	in	academic	
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knowledge	production.	Here	we	want	to	raise	another	set	of	questions	and	draw	attention	to	the	setting	in	which	this	participation	is	typically	thought	to	occur.	This	indeed	needs	the	attention	since	the	assumed	setting	tends	to	be	quite	simplified	and	idealized,	as	we	will	see	when	comparing	it	to	what	is	ordinarily	the	case	in	actual	extra-academic	TD.	We	will	provide	the	comparison	in	terms	of	two	tables,	but	we	first	cite	a	few	examples	to	give	a	flavour	of	the	simplifications.	One	common	assumption	is	that	when	scientists	collaborate	with	extra-academic	agents,	the	most	prominent	social	division	is	precisely	that	between	these	two	communities,	thereby	suppressing	or	marginalizing	divisions	within	them	(see	e.g.	Kitcher	2001,	2011,	Solomon	2009,	King,	Morgan-Olsen	and	Wong	2016,	Wylie	2015).	Another	popular	assumption,	exemplified	by	the	archaeological	projects	Wylie	discusses,	is	that	the	extra-academic	agents	do	not	have	socially	established	roles	as	producers	of	knowledge,	and	that	they	may	represent	socially	marginal	communities.	Yet	another	assumption	simplifies	the	setting	by	assuming	that	there	are	no	epistemic	conflicts	between	the	academic	and	extra-academic	communities.	This	may	sound	odd	given	that	Kitcher	(2001)	and	Longino	(2013)	among	others	observe	that	epistemic	conflicts	between	these	communities	are	perfectly	possible.	For	instance,	certain	dominant	research	approaches	in	the	study	of	human	sexuality	and	aggression	are	not	in	line	with	the	epistemic	interests	of	some	of	the	subjects	being	studied	(Longino	2013).	However,	this	general	admission	does	not	appear	to	apply	throughout	with	equal	weight:	when	explicitly	commenting	on	extra-academic	collaboration	and	
participation,	the	pluralists	we	discuss	here	tend	not	to	concentrate	on	such	conflicts.	Rather,	they	are	set	to	defend	the	very	idea	of	collaboration	and	participation	against	critics	who	worry	about	issues	such	as	relativism	(Wylie	2015).	Sometimes	this	may	be	a	result	of	the	still	lingering	echoes	of	the	“Science	Wars”;	indeed,	Kitcher	discusses	them	in	his	2001	and	2011	books,	thereby	setting	this	as	the	motivating	context	for	his	pluralist	argument.		Table	1	summarises	the	usual	assumptions	about	the	setting	in	the	pluralist	philosophers'	discussion	on	extra-academic	participation	–	call	it	pluralist	
philosophers’	assumed	setting.		Participants	 There	are	two	relevant	groups:	the	researchers	and	the	extra-academic	agents.	Status	as	producers	of	knowledge	 The	researchers	have	a	socially	established	role	and	a	clear	institutional	status	as	producers	of	knowledge,	whereas	the	extra-academic	agents	do	not.	Power	asymmetries	 In	case	there	is	an	acknowledged	power	asymmetry,	the	researchers	are	in	a	(social,	though	not	necessarily	financial)	position	of	power	in	relation	to	the	extra-academic	agents.	
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Epistemic	conflict	 There	may	be	unresolvable	epistemic	conflicts	between	the	different	groups	and	subgroups,	but	such	conflicts	are	not	central	in	the	literature	discussing	extra-academic	collaboration	and	participation.	Value	conflict	 There	may	be	unresolvable	value	conflicts	between	the	different	groups	and	subgroups,	but	such	conflicts	are	not	central	in	the	literature	discussing	extra-academic	collaboration	and	participation.	Table	1	–	Setting	assumed	in	pluralist	PoS	when	discussing	extra-academic	participation			Now	let	us	consider	actual	extra-academic	TD	practices.	The	participants	in	a	TD	project	may	include	several	extra-academic	agents	and	representatives	of	many	scientific	disciplines	or	academic	approaches.	In	contrast	to	the	pluralist	philosophers’	assumed	setting,	some	of	the	extra-academic	participants	may	be	in	positions	of	power	in	relation	to	the	researchers	and	to	other	extra-academic	agents.	Indigenous	and	local	communities	may	often	be	positioned	differently	from,	say,	big	multinational	companies	or	mighty	political	powers2.	It	is	also	perfectly	possible	that	some	of	the	extra-academic	agents	have	socially	established	roles	and	even	institutional	statuses	as	recognised	producers	of	knowledge.	For	instance,	companies	developing	medical	technology	(Rip	2008),	or	important	NGOs	such	as	Greenpeace	(Held	and	Edenhofer	2008),	are	in	such	a	position	that	their	knowledge	claims	are	often	taken	seriously	in	the	surrounding	society.	Many	pluralist	philosophers	join	other	commentators	in	emphasising	that	smooth	integration	of	academic	disciplines	is	often	too	much	to	hope.	Not	all	
intra-academic	epistemic	conflicts	are	presently	resolvable	and	some	may	never	be	resolvable	(Longino	2013,	Kellert,	Longino	and	Waters	2006).	However,	when	discussing	extra-academic	participation,	pluralist	philosophers	typically	do	not	concentrate	on	unresolvable	or	hard	to	solve	epistemic	conflicts	between	academic	researchers	and	extra-academic	agents.	Such	conflicts	are	nevertheless	possible,	and	we	will	discuss	the	issue	in	more	detail	in	section	4.	And	as	we	shall	
																																																								2	Such	asymmetries	were	probably	involved	in	a	project	that	built	a	framework	that	allowed	biophysicists	and	the	representatives	of	indigenous	communities	in	Queensland,	Australia,	to	create	indicators	needed	for	the	protection	and	development	of	a	cultural	landscape	(Cullen-Unsworth	&	al.	2011).	There	were	thirteen	partners/stakeholders	listed	as	participating	in	different	ways	in	the	project.	They	included	two	indigenous	communities,	several	corporations,	several	official	commitees	(for	instance	the	Australian	representative	from	the	UNESCO	World	Heritage	Committee),	the	Commonwealth	Scientific	and	Industrial	Research	Organisation	CSIRO,	and	the	Australian	Institute	of	Aboriginal	and	Torres	Strait	Islander	Studies	(ibid.,	5).	It	is	unlikely	that	the	powers	possessed	by	these	different	partners	was	perfectly	symmetrical,	or	negligibly	asymmetrical	–	and	it	is	clear	that	some	of	the	extra-academic	participants	were	in	positions	of	power	in	relation	to	the	researchers.	
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see	in	section	3,	academic	researchers	can	often	not	avoid	being	influenced	by,	or	taking	part	in,	the	diverse	value	conflicts	that	characterize	TD	projects.	Finally,	the	most	significant	dividing	line	in	an	extra-academic	TD	project	is	not	always	between	the	academic	researchers	and	the	extra-academic	agents.	In	case	there	are	several	contributing	groups,	a	variety	of	alternative	divisions	and	alliances	among	them	may	be	produced	by	existing	power	asymmetries,	divergent	roles	as	producers	of	knowledge,	and	diverse	values	and	interests	between	the	groups.	A	division	more	important	than	that	between	researchers	and	extra-academic	agents	might	emerge,	for	instance,	between	the	researchers	and	the	authorities	on	one	side,	and	a	local	community	on	the	other;	or	between	the	researchers,	NGOs	and	local	communities	on	one	side,	and	local	industries	and	some	political	or	administrative	authorities	on	the	other.	It	is	also	possible	that	academic	researchers	are	divided	into	two	or	more	disagreeing	groups	in	a	TD	project,	allying	with	different	extra-academic	agents,	in	which	case	the	value	conflict	may	be	closely	linked	to	an	epistemic	conflict	between	the	rival	groups	of	academic	researchers.	In	short,	to	use	the	same	parameters	as	in	Table	1,	the	setting	in	actual	
extra-academic	TD	projects	can	be	described	in	the	manner	of	Table	2.		Participants	 There	are	several	relevant	groups:	researchers	from	different	disciplines	or	fields	or	schools,	and	diverse	groups	of	extra-academic	agents.	The	division	between	academic	researchers	and	extra-academic	agents	may	be	less	prominent	than	some	other	division	between	the	participants.	Status	as	producers	of	knowledge	 Typically	only	some	of	the	relevant	groups	have	socially	established	(but	diverse)	roles	and	institutional	statuses	as	producers	of	knowledge.	Power	asymmetries	 There	may	be	complex	power	asymmetries	between	the	different	groups;	e.g.	some	of	the	extra-academic	agents	may	be	in	social	and/or	financial	positions	of	power	in	relation	to	the	researchers	and/or	to	other	extra-academic	agents.	Epistemic	conflict	 There	may	be	unresolvable	or	hard	to	resolve	epistemic	conflicts	between	the	groups.	Value	conflict	 There	may	be	unresolvable	or	hard	to	resolve	value	conflicts	between	the	groups.	Table	2	–	Setting	in	actual	extra-academic	TD	projects	There	are	thus	some	noticeable	differences	between	the	pluralist	philosophers’	assumed	setting,	and	the	settings	in	actual	extra-academic	TD	projects.	The	setting	assumed	by	these	philosophers	is	just	one	amongst	many	possible	ones,	
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and	probably	not	at	all	a	typical	one.	This	matters,	as	there	are	serious	issues	worth	philosophical	attention	that	arise	in	other	kinds	of	settings.	Considering	the	performance	of	pluralist	philosophies	of	science,	this	may	sound	like	a	defeat,	but	we	will	be	delighted	to	explain	how	this	can	be	turned	into	a	victory.	In	the	next	two	sections	we	show	how	some	ideas	and	arguments	presented	in	pluralist	discussions	on	intra-academic	issues	can	be	adapted	for	fruitfully	addressing	issues	related	to	extra-academic	participation	that	arise	in	the	TD	literature.	We	will	start	by	discussing	the	issues	of	integrating	scientific	and	social	values	on	one	hand,	and	those	in	the	integration	of	different	academic	representations,	explanations	and	theories	on	the	other.	In	pluralist	philosophy	of	science	these	forms	of	integration	are	often	discussed	separately,	whereas	in	the	non-philosophical	TD	literature	they	are	seen	as	indivisible	parts	of	one	and	the	same	process.	After	this	we	turn	to	the	idea	of	extra-academic	agents	as	holders	of	valuable	knowledge,	and	the	associated	equivocal	notion	of	extra-academic	knowledge	systems.		
3.	Integration	in	policy-relevant	TD	research	In	comparing	and	contrasting	the	two	literatures	it	is	useful	to	pay	attention	to	the	idea	of	integration.	The	notion	of	integration	used	in	the	TD	literature	tends	to	be	quite	comprehensive	and	ambitious,	as	it	suggests	merging	axiological	items	with	epistemic	items:	the	axiological	integration	of	social	values	with	scientific	values,	and	the	epistemic	integration	of	theories,	explanations,	representations,	conceptualizations	etc.	deriving	from	different	sources	are	considered	inseparable,	parts	of	one	process.	Both	of	these	species	of	integration	are	discussed	also	in	pluralist	philosophies	of	science,	but	they	are	typically	addressed	separately,	and	the	epistemic	variant	is	considered	mainly	in	intra-academic	contexts.		The	integration	of	social	values	with	scientific	ones	is	an	important	issue	in	ongoing	philosophical	discussions	on	the	role	of	science	in	a	democratic	society,	and	on	the	role	stakeholders	should	have	in	research.	These	discussions	are	largely	based	on	the	observation	that	value-judgements	pervade	scientific	practice	(Douglas	2007,	Kitcher	2011),	and	that	"commitments	to	factual	claims	and	to	value-judgements	coevolve"	(Kitcher	2011,	36)	in	science.	However,	the	integration	of	theories,	explanations,	or	representations	is	usually	not	a	central	topic	in	these	discussions.	Instead,	as	we	shall	see,	it	is	taken	up	in	debates	about	unification	and	incommensurability.	In	practice	it	might	be	difficult	or	impossible	to	separate	the	two	species	of	integration.	This	is	reflected	in	the	TD	literature	that	typically	does	not	make	an	analytical	distinction	between	them.	In	actual	TD	research	they	easily	belong	to	the	same,	continuous	process	–	as	happens	in	some	intra-academic	scientific	debates.	However,	in	contrast	to	purely	intra-academic	contexts,	extra-academic	
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TD	has	certain	prominent	characteristics	that	make	a	difference.	One	needs	to	consider	the	consequences	of	characteristics	such	as	these:	non-epistemic	values	
and	interests	are	often	openly	in	the	forefront;	there	is	a	strong	and	urgent	
pressure	to	succeed	in	integration	within	a	limited	time	span;	and	there	are	no	
established	principles	for	quality	assessment	and	no	peer	community	to	apply	them.	As	we	will	see,	these	characteristics	create	potential	difficulties	in	the	assessment	of	TD	research	and	may	sometimes	jeopardise	the	reliability	of	the	produced	knowledge.	In	order	to	analyse	these	difficulties	it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	different	types	of	integration.	Thus	we	suggest	using	distinctions	that	can	be	found	in	the	pluralist	philosophical	literature	to	identify	and	analyse	problems	in	the	TD	literature.	At	the	same	time	we	suggest	building	stronger	links	between	the	two	pluralist	discussions	where	one	or	another	of	the	two	types	of	integration	is	an	important	topic.	Integration	is	often	cited	as	an	indispensable	and	integral	part	of	transdisciplinary	research,	belonging	to	its	"core	methodology"	(Pohl	et	al.	2008,	421).	In	order	to	create	a	functional	solution	to	a	complex	problem,	the	problem	has	to	be	understood	comprehensively,	and	its	attempted	solutions	should	reflect	the	interests	of	all	relevant	stakeholders	and	employ	all	the	available	knowledge	from	different	sources.	Three	characteristics	of	integration	envisaged	in	this	literature	are	worth	noting.	First,	rather	ambitiously,	integration	is	usually	supposed	to	be	realised	through	the	building	of	a	shared	framework,	to	emerge	gradually	in	the	course	of	the	research	process.	The	framework	is	typically	expected	to	include	at	least	shared	ideas	of	the	aims	of	the	project	and	a	shared	set	of	concepts,	and	it	might	involve	for	instance	integrated	methods	and	indicators	and	other	conventions	that	guide	inquiry.	Second,	the	resulting	framework	belongs	to	a	particular	problem-oriented	TD	project	–	rather	than	being	more	broadly	applicable.	Hence	any	particular	achievement	in	transdisciplinary	integration	is	thought	to	be	contingent	and	contextual,	and	therefore	not	generalizable	or	transportable	as	such	to	other	cases.	Third,	the	integrated	framework	does	not	belong	to	any	of	the	contributing	disciplines	nor	to	any	of	the	extra-academic	agents	(Leavy	2011,	28;	Pohl	et	al.	2008,	416).	This	is	indeed	what	‘transdisciplinarity’	is	generally	intended	to	signify:	the	new	framework	transcends	or	transgresses	those	of	the	contributing	parties.	The	rather	"integrated"	notion	of	integration	used	in	the	TD	literature	differs	from	the	ones	used	by	pluralist	philosophers	of	science.	Two	prominent	defenders	of	two	distinct	pluralist	views,	Philip	Kitcher	and	Helen	Longino,	may	agree	on	the	main	argument	related	to	the	integration	of	social	values	with	scientific	values,	but	they	disagree	regarding	the	integration	among	scientific	theories,	representations	and	explanations	–	that	is,	scientific	knowledge	systems	(Kitcher	2002,	Longino	2002b;	see	also	Kellert	Longino	and	Waters	2006,	Van	Bouwel	2015).	The	notion	of	knowledge	systems	is	indeed	used	in	pluralist	philosophies	of	science.	For	example,	Jeroen	Van	Bouwel	(2015:	151)	
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defines	scientific	pluralism	as	"a	normative	endorsement	of	the	multiplicity	of	knowledge	systems"	in	different	areas	of	science.	Knowledge	systems	here	are	taken	to	be	theories,	models,	research	approaches,	and	the	like	(Van	Bouwel	2015,	Kellert,	Longino	and	Waters	2006:	xi,	Mäki	1997),	developed	within	
academia.	As	we	shall	see	in	section	4,	this	notion	differs	from	the	one	used	in	the	TD	literature.	Both	Longino	and	Kitcher	hold	that	there	may	be	reasonable	but	incompatible	and	rival	scientific	representations	of	presumably	the	same	subject.	Having	reviewed	scientific	approaches	to	aggressive	and	sexual	behaviour,	Longino	concludes	that	the	different	approaches	produce	portions	of	knowledge	that	are	suited	for	different	purposes.	No	approach	can	offer	a	more	comprehensive	picture	than	the	others,	so	the	choice	of	approach	depends	on	"what	one	wants	to	do	with	the	knowledge"	(Longino	2013,	205,	see	also	Kellert	Longino	and	Waters	2006).	In	other	words,	the	choice	of	approach	depends	on	values.	Kitcher	argues	that	these	kinds	of	reasonable	value	judgement	pervade	all	levels	of	scientific	practice.	At	all	stages	of	the	research	process,	researchers	need	to	decide	whether	the	probability	for	something	is	high	enough	to	warrant	a	decision,	whether	something	has	been	established	well	enough	to	go	on,	or	whether	the	original	goals	of	a	project	have	to	be	altered	due	to	some	new	observations	(Kitcher	2011,	34-36;	Douglas	2007).	All	such	decisions	are	context	dependent	and	include	value	judgements.	Currently	nearly	none	of	these	value	judgements	are	made	democratically.	Supposing,	as	he	does,	that	academic	research	should	serve	the	society,	Kitcher	calls	for	more	democratic	decision	making	in	science,	and	outlines	what	he	calls	"well-ordered	science"	(Kitcher	2001,	2011).	Well-ordered	science	is	his	version	of	allowing	for	beneficial	incorporation	of	extra-academic	interests	and	values	in	academic	research.	It	is	supposed	to	ensure	that	social	values	influence	research	in	a	democratic	manner.	His	account,	as	noted,	is	somewhat	ambiguous,	as	it	is	not	clear	whether	he	calls	for	the	participation	of	actual	(though	well	tutored)	extra-academic	agents	in	public	deliberations	on	the	goals	of	science	–	or	whether	his	account	should	be	read	as	an	description	of	ideal	decision-making	which	should	not	be	understood	as	a	goal	to	be	emulated	(Brown	2004,	2013).	Either	way,	when	describing	the	role	of	extra-academic	agents	in	well-ordered	science,	Kitcher	assumes,	by	and	large,	the	setting	outlined	in	Table	1.	The	possibility	of	integration	of	intra-academic	knowledge	systems	is	debated	within	the	circles	that	promote	pluralist	philosophy	of	science.	Integration	is	contrasted	to	unification,	and	it	is	often	seen	as	an	alternative	to	theory	reduction	(e.g.	Mitchell	2004).	Some,	such	as	Kitcher	(2002)	and	Sandra	Mitchell	(2004),	would	allow	the	possibility	of	integrating	different	scientific	theories	and	explanations.	Kitcher	holds	that	even	though	"there	is	no	coherent	ideal	of	a	complete	account	of	nature",	and	"at	any	stage	in	the	history	of	the	sciences,	it’s	likely	that	the	representations	accepted	are	not	all	consistent"	
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(Kitcher	2002,	570–5711),	integration	is	still	in	principle	possible.	Mitchell's	(2004)	focus	is	on	the	possibility	of	integrating	findings	related	to	a	single	phenomenon,	and	she	takes	local	integration	to	be	both	possible	and	necessary.	Others	–	Longino	amongst	them	–	however	are	more	cautious	about	the	possibility	of	integration.	They	consider	it	an	open	and	empirical	question	whether	our	epistemic	capabilities	will	ever	allow	us	to	integrate	diverse	representations	of	every	phenomenon,	as	our	ability	to	measure	the	interactions	of	diverse	mechanisms	and	processes	in	complex	systems	is	limited.	Some	phenomena	might	be	so	nebulous	or	complicated	that	a	single,	integrated	representation	is	not	in	our	reach.	If	so,	the	existence	of	many	diverse	and	possibly	incommensurable	representations	of	the	same	phenomenon	should	not	be	seen	as	a	failure.	(Kellert	Longino	and	Waters	2006,	Longino	2002b,	Longino	2013.)	In	the	pluralist	accounts	related	to	the	integration	of	scientific	knowledge	systems	it	is	typically	assumed	that	the	setting	is	of	the	following	kind	(Table	3).		Participants	 There	are	several	relevant	groups	(representing	different	approaches,	representations,	models,	theories,	or	the	like),	all	of	which	are	academic.	Status	as	producers	of	knowledge	 All	of	the	relevant	groups	have	socially	established	roles	and	a	clear	institutional	status	as	producers	of	knowledge.	Power	asymmetries	 There	may	be	some	power	asymmetries	between	the	different	groups.	Epistemic	conflict	 It	is	debatable	whether	the	different	approaches,	representations,	models,	or	theories	can	be	reconciled	(presently	or	ever).	Value	conflict	 Different,	incompatible	or	incommensurable	approaches,	representations,	models,	or	theories	may	reflect	rival	schemes	of	values.		Table	3	–	Setting	assumed	in	pluralist	PoS	when	discussing	intra-academic	integration	of	scientific	knowledge	systems	In	this	assumed	setting,	intra-academic	power	asymmetries	may	obtain.	Some	approaches	are	funded	more	generously	than	others	and	receive	more	public	attention,	and	this	may	be	so	for	dubious	reasons	(see	e.g.	Longino	2013).		Sometimes	the	power	asymmetries	can	lead	to	epistemically	problematic	situations	of	scientific	dominance	or	imperialism	(see	Clarke	and	Walsh	2009,	Mäki	2013).	However,	academic	disciplines	and	research	fields	are	institutionally	recognized	as	having	the	undisputed	status	as	knowledge	
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producers	even	if	intra-academic	integration	were	to	be	unfeasible.	In	extra-academic	TD	the	situation	is	more	complex.		Due	to	stark	power	asymmetries	and	differences	in	the	participants’	statuses	as	producers	of	knowledge,	the	pressure	to	succeed	in	integration	may	be	much	stronger	in	extra-academic	TD	than	in	an	intra-academic	setting.	This	does	not	yet	guarantee	a	high	likelihood	of	success.	While	the	declared	ideal	in	TD	projects	is	to	reach	a	solution	to	the	perceived	problem	such	that	both	the	values	of	all	the	participants	and	all	relevant	knowledge	are	taken	into	account,	it	may	prove	impossible	to	integrate	them.	A	value	conflict	or	an	epistemic	conflict	(or	a	combination	of	the	two)	may	prove	to	be	insurmountable.	In	such	cases	the	project	either	fails	to	reach	a	solution	at	all,	or	fails	to	settle	on	a	consensus	solution:	one	or	more	participants	may	leave	the	project	(or,	in	practice,	might	never	even	join	it),	and	a	solution	is	reached	without	their	contribution;	or	some	participants’	views	may	be	suppressed	or	marginalized	within	the	project,	while	others	dominate	or	overrule.	Such	failures	go	against	the	inclusive	and	democratic	ideals	stressed	in	the	TD	literature	(even	though	it	may	in	reality	end	up	happening	under	the	mask	of	rhetorically	manipulated	quasi-integration).	But	also	the	other	options	are	problematic.	An	agent	who	retreats	from	the	project	may	have	a	socially	established	status	as	a	recognized	producer	or	holder	of	knowledge.	As	shown	in	Table	2,	this	can	be	the	case	even	if	the	agent	is	extra-academic.	If	so,	its	viewpoint	can	be	taken	into	account	in	subsequent	decision	making	even	if	it	proves	to	be	unfeasible	to	integrate	its	values	and/or	knowledge	with	the	values	and/or	knowledge	of	the	participants	of	the	project.	A	situation	like	this	could	lead	to	two	(or	more)	competing	proposed	solutions	to	the	problem	at	hand.	The	values	and	knowledge	of	all	the	groups	for	whom	the	solution	is	of	relevance	are	not	represented	in	any	of	the	proposed	solutions,	and	so	there	is	likely	to	be	a	conflict	at	the	stage	of	policy	decision	making.	This	runs	counter	to	the	dominant	doctrine	of	extra-academic	TD	that	includes	a	preference	for	solutions	that	all	such	groups	could	accept,	so	anything	less	than	this	would	be	suboptimal.	If	instead	the	agent	not	taking	part	in	the	project	does	not	have	a	socially	established	status	as	a	producer	or	holder	of	knowledge,	it	is	likely	that	its	values	and	knowledge	are	not	well	represented	in	the	problem	solution	the	project	arrives	at.	On	top	of	this	intra-project	weakness,	the	agent	is	likely	to	have	slim	chances	of	influencing	those	decisions	also	outside	the	project.	This	too	goes	against	the	inclusive	and	democratic	ideals	stressed	in	the	TD	literature.		These	are	however	not	the	only	reasons	why	integration	is	stressed	in	extra-academic	TD.	Some	of	the	extra-academic	agents	might	be	in	a	position	of	power	in	relation	to	the	researchers	(in	contrast	to	the	pluralist	philosophers’	assumed	setting).	In	some	of	the	TD	projects	mentioned	above	it	might	be	politically	unthinkable	for	the	researchers	to	give	up	on	the	attempt	to	integrate		their	own	interests	and	approaches	with	those	of	the	particularly	powerful	
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agents.	If	the	researchers	were	to	produce	the	needed,	allegedly	policy-relevant	knowledge,	but	some	such	sufficiently	powerful	extra-academic	agents	would	not	accept	their	results,	the	offered	solution	would	be	less	likely	to	be	implemented.	A	result	of	a	TD	project	that	is	a	problem	solution	that	has	no	chances	of	being	implemented	is	a	bad	result,	and	the	project	is	a	failure.	This	fortifies	the	importance	of	integration.	As	we	can	see,	there	are	strong	pressures	in	TD	projects	to	succeed	in	integration.	Failure	to	integrate	may	lead	to	the	failure	of	the	whole	project:	it	may	fail	to	reach	a	solution,	or	fail	to	adhere	to	its	democratic	ideals,	or	fail	to	influence	policy.	Furthermore,	inspired	by	systems	theory,	the	literature	on	TD	is	generally	quite	optimistic	regarding	the	prospects	of	integration.	Hence	it	is	not	surprising	that	the	literature	is	full	of	confident	statements	about	integration.		From	a	pluralist	point	of	view	this	optimism	seems	excessive.	Even	modest	forms	of	scientific	pluralism	would	adhere	to	the	view	that	existing	scientific	knowledge	systems	may	not	be	integratable.	When	examining	systems	theory	approaches	in	the	study	of	behaviour,	Longino	(2013)	notes	the	problem:	the	view	that	all	factors	in	a	complex	system	interact	with	each	other	is	most	likely	correct	in	a	metaphysical	sense,	but	no	integrated	research	approach	manages	to	study	more	than	a	very	small	part	of	these	interactions.	Moreover,	even	if	possible,	in	practice	the	integration	of	just	a	limited	range	of	scientific	approaches	takes	time	and	effort.	An	ideal	(and	non-existent)	extra-academic	TD	project	would	manage	to	build	a	rich,	detailed	and	fully	shared	framework	that	consists	of	a	shared	understanding	of	the	relevant	problem,	shared	values,	shared	concepts,	shared	ways	of	argumentation,	shared	ways	of	producing	knowledge,	and	shared	standards	according	to	which	knowledge	claims	are	justified	and	results	evaluated.	As	Henrik	Thorén	and	Line	Breian	(2015)	point	out,	the	building	of	such	a	framework	for	the	use	of	just	one	project	is	an	unrealistic	demand.	Interdisciplinary	integration	is	difficult	enough	even	in	permanent	settings,	and	hasty	attempts	easily	lead	to	pseudo-integration	(see	Van	Der	Steen	1993).	The	integration	of	values	may	also	be	difficult.	As	Aant	Elzinga	(2008)	points	out,	especially	in	cases	where	there	are	political	tensions	and	conflicts	of	interest	between	the	different	extra-academic	groups,	a	more	attainable	objective	is	the	creation	of	a	limited	number	of	boundary	objects	or	boundary	
concepts	that	can	be	used	as	means	of	communication	between	the	groups.	Such	boundary	objects	do	not	need	to	be	understood	in	exactly	the	same	way	by	all	groups	involved	in	the	project.	They	are	both	plastic	and	robust	as	they	"have	different	meanings	in	different	social	worlds	but	their	structure	is	common	enough	to	more	than	one	world	to	make	them	recognizable,	a	means	of	translation"	(Star	and	Giresemer	1989,	393).	Thanks	to	this	duality	of	plasticity	and	robustness,	they	enable	communication	across	intersecting	social	worlds.	However,	as	the	ambitions	of	a	desirable	TD	project	suggest	seeking	to	combine	
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the	integration	of	values	with	the	integration	of	scientific	knowledge	systems,	this	will	not	always	be	sufficient	for	a	satisfactory	solution.	Consider	the	idea	of	"wicked	problems"	in	the	light	of	the	idea	that	different,	incommensurable	approaches,	representions,	models,	explanations	or	the	like	may	reflect	rival	schemes	of	values.	A	wicked	problem	is	perceived	differently	by	the	different	groups	it	touches,	and	the	different	approaches	may	involve	different	understandings	of	the	problem.	In	such	a	setting	it	is	very	understandable	that	the	two	species	of	integration	–	the	integration	of	values	and	the	integration	of	knowledge	systems	–	are	seen	as	one	and	the	same	process.	In	practice	it	can	be	impossible	to	separate	the	processes	that	aim	at	integration	of	values	and	integration	of	knowledge.	Yet	the	conflation	of	the	axiological	and	the	epistemic	may	result	in	problematic	outcomes.	If	a	working	agreement	on	the	values	is	reached	by	merely	creating	boundary	objects,	this	may	lead	to	forced	and	artificial	attempts	of	integrating	incommensurable	academic	approaches,	and	thereby	to	pseudo-integration.	In	the	TD	literature	integration	is	often	considered	according	to	a	deliberative	model	of	democracy	(for	critique	and	other	models,	see	Van	Bouwel	2009b):	integration	is	to	happen	through	mutual	learning	and	deliberation.	In	the	Handbook	of	Transdisciplinary	Research	Pohl	et	al	(2008)	distinguish	three	basic	ways	in	which	integration	may	happen:	common	group	learning,	deliberation	by	experts,	and	integration	by	a	subgroup	or	an	individual.	The	aim	is	to	find	an	agreeable	solution	to	a	specific	problem	at	hand,	so	it	is	crucial	to	find	an	understanding	of	the	problem	itself	such	that	all	participants	can	agree	on	its	formulation.	In	contrast	to	many	purely	academic	settings,	the	values	are	openly	at	the	forefront.	This	has	consequences	for	the	way	in	which	the	notion	of	integration	is	understood,	and	for	how	it	is	thought	to	be	realized.	Given	the	strong	pressure	to	succeed	in	integration	in	little	time,	there	is	a	risk	that	common	group	learning	and	deliberation	lead	only	to	the	creation	of	hollow	boundary	objects,	and	therefore	to	pseudo-integration	of	knowledge	systems	–	including	academic	ones.	Moreover,	as	every	TD	project	is	supposed	to	create,	as	part	of	its	integrated	framework,	its	own	criteria	of	assessment,	it	may	be	difficult	to	detect	cases	of	such	pseudo-integration	even	when	they	obtain.		The	problem	is	especially	acute	if	the	integration	is	attempted	just	by	a	subgroup	or	an	individual.	Unfortunately,	this	cannot	be	easily	alleviated	as	“there	is	not	yet	a	well-established	community	of	peers	experienced	in	reviewing	the	quality	of	TD	endeavours”	and	therefore	“critically	robust	ways	to	discuss	and	evaluate	the	quality	of	TD	research	are	underdeveloped	and	insufficient”	(Wickson	et	al.	2006,	1055;	see	also	Leavy	2011,	125ff).	Given	that	TD	research	is	broad	and	diffuse,	evolving	and	context-specific	(ibid.),	it	is	not	surprising	that	there	are	no	agreed-upon	ways	available	for	reliably	assessing	the	outcomes	of	TD	projects.	In	other	words,	there	might	be	no	trans-project	consensus	attainable	on	how	precisely	to	evaluate	transdisciplinary	research	in	general	and	
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individual	projects	in	particular.	Indeed,	if	each	project	is	supposed	to	create	its	own	framework,	and	then	build	on	it,	the	establishing	of	a	broadly	operational	peer	community,	distinct	from	particular	transitory	TD	research	teams,	will	prove	difficult	if	not	impossible.3	The	tension	between	the	philosophical	pluralists	discussed	here	and	the	extra-academic	transdisciplinarians	of	the	TD	literature	now	emerges	rather	clearly.	The	pluralists	stress	the	epistemic	benefits	of	plurality,	while	the	transdisciplinarians	vehemently	endorse	comprehensive	integration.	The	tension	is	particularly	pronounced	in	the	transdisciplinarians’	stress	on	integration	that	has	the	consequence	of	marginalizing	the	benefits	of	plurality	that	is	rather	considered	a	nuisance	to	be	suppressed.	Philosophical	pluralists	recognize	the	difficulties	of	integration,	but	they	are	not	blind	to	its	desirability	if	conceived	rather	weakly	and	selectively.	Sandra	Mitchell	(2003)	endorses	what	she	calls	integrative	pluralism	–	the	integration	of	a	plurality	of	partial	models	–	in	addressing	biological	complexity,	but	this	is	an	intra-academic	and	epistemic	matter,	devoid	of	the	complications	due	to	the	involvement	of	extra-academic	interests	and	contributions	(see	also	Van	Bouwel	2014).	Kitcher	has	a	broader	view,	suggesting	that	social	values	should	be	integrated	with	scientific	values.	Yet	this	is	a	rather	weak	idea	of	integration,	as	it	does	not	go	all	the	way	to	welcoming	epistemic	contributions	from	extra-academic	agents.	Wylie,	in	turn,	welcomes	epistemic	contributions	from	extra-academic	agents,	but	does	not	stress	integration.	The	transdisciplinarians	keep	reminding	that	practical	or	societal	problems	in	need	of	solutions	are	often	of	the	kind	that	no	existing	academic	discipline	or	even	several	such	disciplines	can	offer	solutions	that	would	satisfy	all	stakeholders.	Integration	with	the	relevant	portions	of	extra-academic	values	and	knowledge,	reflecting	the	viewpoints	and	interests	of	those	stakeholders,	is	therefore	required.	So	there	is	often	an	urgent	pressure	towards	comprehensive	integration.	Given	the	severe	constraints	–	of	time,	competence,	and	contents	of	the	items	to	be	integrated	–	the	outcome	may	fall	far	short	of	what	should	ideally	transpire.	Pseudo-integration	may	be	an	outcome	of	politically	or	commercially	forced	but	uneasy	and	unstable	compromise	on	values	in	combination	with	pretentious	claims	of	having	accommodated	all	relevant	epistemic	contributions	in	a	balanced	and	coherent	manner	–	while	evaluative	claims	of	this	sort	would	be	hard	to	justify	in	the	absence	of	agreed-upon	standards.																																																													3	Yet	another	potential	risk	is	related	to	the	deliberative	way	in	which	integration	is	supposed	to	happen,	and	to	the	lack	of	larger	peer	communities.	As	Miriam	Solomon	(2006)	notes,	consensus-seeking	deliberation	may	lead	to	so	called	"groupthink",	in	which	dissenting	individuals	do	not	share	their	thoughts	due	to	peer	pressure	and	pressure	from	the	authorities.	Kristina	Rolin	(2011,	32)	argues	that	even	though	this	may	happen	in	research	teams,	it	is	less	likely	to	take	place	in	larger,	socially	dispersed	scientific	communities.	Thus	the	dissenting	views	will	be	expressed	by	members	of	the	larger	community.	However,	as	in	TD	such	communities	do	not	exist,	groupthink	may	go	unnoticed.	
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It	could	prove	beneficial	for	the	development	of	transdisciplinarity	if	pluralist	philosophers	of	science	sympathetic	to	at	least	some	of	the	aims	of	extra-academic	TD	would	pay	more	attention	to	questions	related	to	the	integration	not	only	of	scientific	and	social	values,	but	of	extra-academic	epistemic	contributions	with	scientific	ones.	This	would	likely	require	taking	into	account	the	complex	settings	of	actual	TD	projects	(e.g.	those	exhibited	in	Table	2).	Here	philosophers	have	a	chance	of	learning	from	the	empirical	parts	of	the	TD	literature.	On	the	other	hand,	philosophers	are	in	a	position	to	reciprocate.	As	we	have	shown,	pluralist	discussions	of	intra-academic	integration	can	be	fruitfully	applied	to	the	scrutiny	of	the	integration	of	intra-	and	extra-academic	perspectives	and	interests.	We	believe	it	would	be	welcome	for	philosophers	of	science	sympathetic	to	the	ideals	of	TD	to	focus	on	the	potential	epistemic	pitfalls	of	actual	TD	endeavours.	Normative	philosophical	work	on	these	issues,	highly	relevant	for	extra-academic	TD,	is	needed	but	presently	missing,	so	there	is	demand	for	philosophers’	services.	In	the	next	section	we	will	comment	on	a	different	problem.	In	the	TD	literature	the	actual	process	of	integration	is	usually	understood	as	resembling	deliberative,	democratic	decision	making.	As	noted,	such	an	approach	may	not	yield	the	desired	outcomes	when	trying	to	integrate	different	scientific	or	academic	inputs,	as	it	ignores	the	possibility	of	irresolvable	epistemic	conflicts.	Moreover,	in	an	extra-academic	setting	there	is	another	way	in	which	mutual	learning	and	deliberation	can	fail.	It	may	be	unfeasible	to	integrate	academic	knowledge	with	extra-academic	knowledge.	In	collaborative	and	participatory	research	there	may	be	specific	kinds	of	epistemic	conflict,	ones	that	are	less	likely	to	occur	in	purely	intra-academic	settings.		
4.	The	idea	of	knowledge	systems	Many	scientific	pluralists	hold	that	a	variety	of	different	approaches	is	epistemically	beneficial	in	science,	as	it	can	help	ensure	that	all	research	is	under	broad	and	intensive	critical	scrutiny	(e.g.	Longino	1990,	2002,	Kitcher	1993).	This	idea	can	be	extended	to	extra-academic	contributions,	too.	The	critical	viewpoints	of	extra-academic	agents	may	be	epistemically	beneficial.	Drawing	from	social	epistemology	and	feminist	philosophy	of	science,	Alison	Wylie	has	recently	analysed	collaborative	research	practices	in	archaeology.	She	defends	a	form	of	"dynamic	pluralism":	encounters	and	interactions	with	indigenous	people's	knowledge	systems	can	"destabilize	entrenched	epistemic	and	methodological	norms"	in	academic	archaeology	(Wylie	2015,	204),	and	thus	be	potentially	epistemically	beneficial	–	provided	those	norms	are	in	need	of	destabilization.	Related	ideas	have	been	advanced	in	feminist	philosophy	of	science	when	discussing	forms	of	epistemic	injustice,	and	the	knowledge	of	socially	marginalized	people.	Miranda	Fricker	(2007)	distinguishes	between	
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testimonial	and	hermeneutical	injustice:	people	belonging	to	socially	marginal	groups	are	not	acknowledged	as	credible	sources	of	knowledge;	or	the	dominant	majority	lacks	the	conceptual	resources	needed	for	understanding	their	critical	viewpoints	(see	also	Fehr	and	Plaisance	2010,	Wylie	2011,	King,	Morgan-Olsen	and	Wong	2016).	Acknowledging	such	groups	as	potential	sources	of	knowledge,	and	expanding	conceptual	frameworks	so	as	to	encompass	their	viewpoints,	may	prove	not	only	ethically	but	also	epistemically	beneficial.	Recent	decades	have	witnessed	a	growing	interest	in	the	knowledge	held	by	people	whose	ideas	used	to	be	seen	as	perhaps	interesting	beliefs	worth	the	attention	of	anthropologists	as	a	target	of	study,	but	not	as	valuable	knowledge	akin	to	that	produced	by	scientific	inquiry.	The	situation	has	changed:	‘knowledge’	has	become	a	flexible	buzzword.	It	is	popular	today	in	many	disciplines	to	be	open	to	the	idea	of	utilizing	"different	kinds	of	knowledge"	in	research,	such	as	tacit	knowledge,	indigenous	knowledge,	artistic	knowledge,	the	know-how	of	practitioners,	and	so	on.	At	the	same	time	postcolonialism	has	influenced	many	humanistic	and	social	scientific	disciplines	and	drawn	attention	to	the	knowledge	systems	of	non-Western	peoples.		As	noted,	the	notion	of	knowledge	systems	–	in	plural	–	is	used	in	pluralist	philosophies	of	science.	This	notion	is	however	restricted:	knowledge	systems	are	taken	to	be	theories,	models,	research	approaches,	and	the	like	developed	within	academia.	In	contrast,	the	notion	of	knowledge	systems	used	when	discussing	extra-academic	participation	is	broader.	When	it	is	combined	with	the	stress	on	the	very	broadly	conceived	integration	typical	of	the	TD	literature,	and	with	the	optimistic	idea	that	integration	is	to	happen	through	mutual	learning	and	deliberation,	it	may	lead	to	problematic	outcomes.	We	believe	that	the	possibility	of	academic	and	extra-academic	knowledge	systems	not	being	amenable	to	integration	requires	more	nuanced	attention	than	it	has	yet	received.	As	noted,	such	a	possibility	is	discussed	only	in	passing	in	the	philosophical	literature	mentioned	above	(e.g.	Kitcher	2001,	Longino	2013).4	The	question	is,	what	to	make	of	this	possibility	and		how	to	examine	it.	We	think	interactive	accounts	of	objectivity	developed	in	pluralist	philosophies	of	science	and	social	epistemology	are	useful	for	elucidating	our	stance.	The	use	of	extra-academic	knowledge	and	the	participation	of	extra-academic	agents	are	among	the	core	characteristics	of	extra-academic	TD.	In	research	seeking	to	be	policy-relevant	the	role	of	academic	researchers	as	the	sole	providers	of	valuable	knowledge	is	seen	as	problematic.	The	perceived	advantages	of	the	involvement	of	extra-academic	agents	are	both	ethical	and																																																									4	There	are	philosophers	who	criticise	attempts	to	take	extra-academic	knowledge	systems	seriously	(for	instance	Paul	Boghossian,	2006),	but	they	have	not	yet	been	active	in	offering	ideas	that	could	be	of	use	in	developing	TD	practices.	
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epistemic:	it	is	hoped	to	balance	power	asymmetries	between	academic	researchers	and	the	extra-academic	agents;	and	to	broaden	the	academic	researchers'	and	the	extra-academic	agents’	understanding	of	the	issues	at	stake,	by	bringing	in	numerous	perspectives	and	a	rich	array	of	detailed	information	needed	for	addressing	the	complex	issues.	It	is	not	only	their	values	that	are	to	be	taken	into	account	in	extra-academic	TD,	but	their	knowledge,	too;	and	they	are	supposed	to	actively	contribute	to	TD	projects	as	partners.	Elsewhere	there	are	important	discussions	on	kinds	of	knowledge	relevant	here	–	such	as	tacit	knowledge	(Polanyi	1966,	Collins	2010)	and	indigenous	knowledge	(e.g.	Agrawal	1995,	Harding	2011,	Sillitoe	&	Marzano	2009)	–	but	these	discussions	are	not	strongly	interconnected.	Some	ideas	developed	therein	have	been	adopted	to	the	literature	on	TD,	but	the	differences	in	the	ways	in	which	kinds	of	knowledge	can	be	understood	and	utilized,	have	not	as	yet	gained	much	attention	(see	Raymond	&	al.	2010).	For	a	starter,	we	suggest	a	broad	and	very	rough	distinction	between	two	ways	in	which	extra-academic	knowledge	is	approached	in	TD:	1)	Bits	and	pieces.	Extra-academic	knowledge	can	be	understood	as	bits	and	pieces	that	can	in	principle	be	incorporated	into	larger	epistemic	structures	produced	by	academic	research.	They	can	originally	belong	to	a	community	or	to	an	individual.	Once	they	are	recognised	and	adequately	interpreted,	the	hope	is	that	they	can	be	put	into	fruitful	use	in	academic	research.	At	least	this	is	not	prevented	by	them	originally	having	been	alien	to	academic	aspirations.	They	can	be	a	source	of	detailed	information	needed	for	specifying	initial	or	boundary	conditions	of	theoretical	reasoning	whose	structure	and	foundations	remain	intact.	Or	they	can	play	a	role	in	critically	challenging	such	structures	by	revealing	inadequate	assumptions	on	the	side	of	the	academic	researchers,	or	in	more	constructively	supplementing	otherwise	insufficient	academic	knowledge.	Getting	access	to	such	useful	bits	and	pieces	may	also	require	significant	changes	in	research	methods.	Case	studies	of	transdisciplinary	projects	often	–	implicitly	or	explicitly	–	refer	to	this	way	of	understanding	extra-academic	knowledge.		2)	Whole	knowledge	systems.	At	times	extra-academic	knowledge	is	understood	more	wholistically	as	distinct	and	complete	knowledge	systems	that	significantly	differ	from	academic	knowledge	systems	and	therefore	are	not	easily	translatable	or	incorporatable	into	the	latter.	Theoretical	contributions	to	the	discussions	about	transdisciplinarity	at	times	understand	extra-academic	knowledge	in	this	way.	It	is	far	from	clear	what	exactly	‘knowledge	system’	is	intended	to	mean,	but	the	term	is	ubiquitous	especially	in	the	literature	on	indigenous	knowledge.	Expressions	such	as	‘alternative	epistemologies’	and	‘non-western	paradigms’	are	also	popular.	We	take	it	that	in	addition	to	a	body	of	
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accepted	beliefs,	a	knowledge	system	is	characterised	by	some	distinctive	epistemic	principles	and	values	as	well	as	associated	standards	for	the	justification	of	knowledge	claims.	As	noted,	individuals	can	have	bits	and	pieces	of	knowledge,	and	they	do	not	need	to	share	them	with	other	people.	The	idea	of	a	knowledge	system	instead	involves	the	idea	of	an	epistemic	community	more	or	less	in	agreement	on	a	system	of	beliefs	and	epistemic	norms.	As	can	be	seen,	the	notion	of	a	knowledge	system	in	the	TD	literature	is	broader	and	more	vague	than	the	one	used	in	the	pluralist	philosophy	of	science.	It	often	comes	close	to	an	anthropological	notion	of	knowledge	systems.	They	are	taken	to	be	organic	cultural	systems	that	need	to	be	treated	as	wholes	to	be	properly	understood	(Vayda,	Walters	and	Setyawati,	2004).	Detaching	elements,	for	instance	individual	knowledge	claims,	from	such	a	system	for	separate	examination	is	considered	misleading	since	they	are	bound	to	be	misunderstood	if	taken	out	of	their	proper	systemic	context.	Importantly,	and	in	contrast	to	the	respective	notion	in	pluralist	philosophies	of	science,	the	anthropological	notion	
has	not	been	developed	for	normative	epistemic	purposes.	This	is	understandable	given	that	the	research	questions	in	anthropology	usually	do	not	necessitate	epistemic	assessment	of	traditional	knowledge	systems	(Koskinen	2014).	Rather,	the	focus	in	anthropology	is	on	understanding	and	translating,	and	a	major	goal	is	to	avoid	ethnocentrism	(thus	the	use	of	the	word	"knowledge",	not	"belief").	These	concerns	are	of	course	very	relevant	also	in	promoting	and	assessing	extra-academic	TD	projects.	Nevertheless,	when	extra-academic	knowledge	systems	are	to	be	integrated	with	academic	ones,	normative	epistemic	assessment	becomes	indispensable.	In	some	versions	of	extra-academic	TD	the	notion	of	knowledge	system	is,	however,	loaded	with	another	kind	of	normativity:	"non-Western"	knowledge,	once	marginalized,	should	be	taken	seriously,	as	it	is	at	least	as	important	as	"Western"	scientific	knowledge	–	which,	as	Arun	Agrawal	(1995)	notes,	is	often	very	problematically	assumed	to	constitute	a	single	coherent	knowledge	system.	The	view	that	there	are	"culturally	specific	ways	of	knowing"	(Whitt	2009,	xv)	that	have	their	own,	distinctive	epistemologies,	is	promoted	in	postcolonial	literature,	and	it	has	been	adopted	also	in	some	versions	of	extra-academic	TD.	The	tone	is	sometimes	sanguinely	revolutionary:	non-Western	knowledge	systems	are	supposed	to	liberate	us	from	the	limitations	of	("Cartesian"	and	"dualistic")	Western	thought	by	opening	up	entirely	new	ways	of	thinking	and	knowing	(e.g.	Arabena	2010).	The	discussion	is	strongly	linked	to	feminist	and	postcolonial	philosophy,	where	non-Western	knowledge	systems	are	at	times	seen	as		"other	cultures'	sciences"	(Harding	2011).		Then	consider	the	notion	of	knowledge	system	in	pluralist	philosophy	of	science.	Alison	Wylie's	pluralist	account	of	the	epistemically	influential	role	that	extra-academic	knowledge	systems	could	have	in	academic	research	is	very	
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moderate	when	compared	to	the	revolutionaly	visions	of	the	TD	literature.	For	instance,	she	does	not	speak	for	integration	of	knowledge	systems,	but	rather	more	moderately	for	interaction	and	exchange	between	them.	However,	she	does	use	a	broader	notion	of	knowledge	systems	than	is	typical	in	philosophy	of	science.	According	to	her,	indigenous	communities	can	offer	not	only	complementary	expertise	on	certain	issues,	but	also	usefully	critical	viewpoints	that	are	helpful	in	error	elimination,	in	identifying	and	removing	mistakes	and	imperfections	in	academic	knowledge.	Along	these	lines,	Wylie	proposes	an	extension	to	Longino's	norm	of	"tempered	equality	of	epistemic	authority".	The	norm	stresses	the	epistemic	importance	of	listening	to	dissenting	voices	regardless	of	the	speaker's	social	position	in	an	epistemic	community	(Longino	2002,	131).	Longino	however	focuses	mainly	on	academic	communities.	Wylie	suggests	that	the	norm	should	be	explicitly	extended	beyond	the	boundaries	of	the	academia:	In	order	to	counteract	the	risks	of	insularity	and	the	effects	of	dysfunctional	group	dynamics	that	can	insulate	foundational	assumptions	and	norms	of	justification	from	critical	scrutiny,	well	functioning	epistemic	communities	should	actively	cultivate	collaborations	with	external	communities	whose	epistemic	goals,	practices,	and	beliefs	differ	from	their	own	in	ways	that	have	the	potential	to	mobilise	transformative	criticism.	(Wylie	2015,	207).	Wylie	talks	about	"alternative	epistemic	systems",	"systems	of	knowledge"	and	"autonomous	epistemic	traditions",	and	she	proposes	extending	the	notion	of	knowledge	systems	so	as	to	encompass	systems	that	have	earlier	been	of	interest	mainly	to	anthropologists.	As	her	aim	is	to	give	an	account	of	the	potential	epistemic	advantages	of	broadly	based	interaction	and	collaboration,	and	given	that	she	is	not	suggesting	the	integration	of	academic	and	extra-academic	systems,	it	is	understandable	that	she	is	not	concerned	about	the	possibility	of	serious	conflicts	between	academic	and	extra-academic	knowledge	systems.	Rather,	she	considers	some	worries	about	such	conflicts	to	be	exaggerated.	Her	account	by	and	large	assumes	the	setting	described	in	Table	1.	Dominant	versions	of	extra-academic	TD	do	not	merely	aim	at	interaction	and	exchange	between	academic	and	extra-academic	knowledge	systems,	but	the	more	ambitious	goal	is	their	integration.	In	an	ideal	TD	project	the	participant	epistemic	communities,	academic	and	extra-academic	alike,	build	a	rich	shared	framework	and	work	closely	together	at	all	stages	of	the	research	process:	"problem	identification,	conceptualization	and	planning,	data	collection	and	interpretation,	and	the	dissemination	of	the	research	results	–	including	(co)authorship"	(Leavy	2011,	88).	In	other	words,	the	result	is	a	merged	epistemic	community	that	has	created	an	integrated	knowledge	system	of	its	own.	In	our	view,	it	is	important	to	examine	the	potential	epistemic	pitfalls	in	research	that	aims	at	such	integration.	
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The	possibility	of	irreconcilable	epistemic	conflicts	between	accepted	scientific	approaches	and	certain	alternative	stances,	such	as	creationism,	is	the	topic	of	yet	another	pluralist	discussion:	the	one	about	the	role	and	legitimacy	of	dissent	and	the	limits	related	to	uptake	of	criticism.	This	can	also	be	seen	as	giving	rise	to	what	we	identify	as	a	pluralistic	version	of	the	demarcation	problem.	The	question	is	whether	there	are	criteria	that	would	allow	an	advocate	of	a	pluralist	stance	to	rule	out	creationism	and	climate	change	denialism	(and	the	like)	as	not	being	of	the	right	kind	of	dissent	that	should	be	taken	into	account	in	objective	scientific	research.	Many	pluralists	value	dissent,	as	it	may	promote	creativity	and	the	detection	of	errors	and	may	thereby	lead	to	the	improvement	of	scientific	theories.	However,	some	forms	of	dissent	may	be	harmful,	and	even	if	scientists	have	an	obligation	to	engage	dissenting	views,	this	obligation	should	not	extend	to	just	any	dissent	(Longino	1993,	Longino	2002,	Solomon	2008,	Kitcher	2011,	Melo-Martin	and	Intermann	2014,	Biddle	and	Leuchner	2015).	In	this	discussion	the	following	setting	is	usually	assumed	(Table	4).		Participants	 There	are	two	relevant	groups:	the	mainstream	scientific	researchers	and	the	dissenters.	Status	as	producers	of	knowledge	 The	researchers	as	well	as	the	dissenters	have	at	least	to	some	degree	socially	established	roles	and	an	institutional	status	as	producers	of	knowledge.	Power	asymmetries	 There	is	no	consistent	power	asymmetry	across	situations;	the	dissenters	may	in	some	cases	be	in	social	or	financial	positions	of	power	in	relation	to	the	mainstream	researchers,	while	in	some	other	cases	the	situation	may	be	the	opposite.	Epistemic	conflict	 There	is	a	serious,	perhaps	irreconcilable	epistemic	conflict	between	the	two	groups.	Value	conflict	 The	epistemic	conflict	typically	reflects	an	important	conflict	of	values.	Table	4	–	Setting	assumed	in	pluralist	PoS	when	discussing	problematic	dissent		One	response	to	the	pluralistic	demarcation	problem	is	to	refer	to	interactive	accounts	of	objectivity	that	stress	the	qualities	of	epistemic	communities	(see	Douglas	2007).	For	instance,	Longino	(1990,	2002)	has	formulated	norms	or	criteria	according	to	which	the	objectivity	of	research	communities	can	be	evaluated,	and	she	uses	them	to	delimit	scientists'	obligations	towards	dissenters	such	as	creationists.	The	criteria	include	(1)	the	existence	of	venues	for	effective	criticism,	such	as	journals	and	conferences;	(2)	uptake	of	criticism:	"beliefs	and	theories	must	change	over	time	in	response	to	the	critical	discourse	taking	place"	(Longino	2002,	129);	(3)	publicly	recognized	standards	of	
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evaluation	of	observations	and	theories;	and	the	already	mentioned	(4)	tempered	equality	of	epistemic	authority:	"the	social	position	or	economic	power	of	an	individual	or	group	in	a	community	ought	not	to	determine	who	or	what	perspectives	are	taken	seriously	in	that	community"	(ibid.,	131).	If	the	dissenters	themselves	do	not	strive	to	meet	these	criteria	–	if	they	for	example	do	not	take	outside	criticism	into	account	–	researchers	are	not	obliged	to	use	their	time	for	what	appear	to	be	clearly	fruitless	debates	with	them.	Let	us	now	consider	an	example:	a	conference	organised	by	the	Southern	Interior	Forest	Extension	and	Research	Partnership	and	En'owkin	Centre	(taking	place	in	Quaaout	Lodge	on	the	Little	Shuswap	Reserve,	near	Chase,	British	Columbia,	in	March	2001),	devoted	to	examining	the	possibilities	of	linking	indigenous	knowledge	with	scientific	knowledge	in	natural	resource	management	(Michel	&	Gayton	2002).	The	aim	of	the	conference	was	to	recognize	indigenous	knowledge	"as	a	knowledge	system	of	equal	importance	to	western	science",	and	to	incorporate	it	into	ecosystem-based	natural	resource	management	(Michel	2002,	4).	The	participants	included	"indigenous	knowledge	keepers,	scientists,	resource	managers,	elders	and	academics"	(Michel	&	Gayton	2002,	iv).	The	conference	proceedings	make	it	clear	that	there	were	strong	tensions	between	the	participant	groups.	Not	all	believed	the	integrative	goals	to	be	achievable,	mainly	because	of	differences	between	scientific	and	indigenous	knowledge	systems,	and	because	of	power	imbalances	between	scientists,	academics	and	the	resource	managers	on	one	side,	and	the	indigenous	knowledge	keepers	and	elders	on	the	other.	Several	indigenous	participants	feared	it	would	lead	to	all	too	familiar	epistemic	injustices.	A	participant	expressed	the	worry	appositely:	"If	there	is	a	gap,	and	the	two	systems	are	fundamentally	different,	then	you	can't	link	them.	Or	if	you	did,	it	would	be	one-sided,	with	Western	science	calling	the	shots"	(Michel	&	Gayton	2002,	54).	However,	the	organisers	were	keen	on	achieving	their	goals.	This	led	to	potentially	problematic	outcomes.	The	president	of	the	conference	describes	the	practices	developed	when	planning	the	conference	in	the	following	way:	Gaining	the	blessing	of	the	Elders	and	the	permission	of	the	spirits	of	the	land	tells	me	that	we	are	heading	in	the	right	direction.	Imagine	how	this	conference	would	have	turned	out	if	we	did	not	follow	these	protocols.	We	would	probably	have	made	some	horrendous	mistakes.	(Michel	2002,	5.)	It	is	not	unheard	of	in	indigenous	communities	that	epistemic	authority	depends	on	the	speaker's	age,	or	the	person’s	status	as	an	elder.	This	is	of	course	inconsistent	with	Longino's	(2002)	criterion	of	tempered	equality:	the	epistemic	authority	of	the	elders	is	determined	by	their	social	position.	Nevertheless,	the	president	of	the	conference	adopted	this	social-epistemic	practice.	
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It	may	well	be	that	this	example	proves	to	be	unproblematic.	Michel's	words	can	be	interpreted	as	a	courtesy	rather	than	an	epistemological	statement.	It	is	also	possible	that	such	problematic	principles	are	flexible	and	negotiable	–	that	the	indigenous	communities	in	question	would,	in	the	end,	be	prepared	to	renounce	them	in	the	context	of	a	research	project.	However,	if	the	epistemically	privileged	status	of	the	elders5	happens	to	be	something	the	indigenous	epistemic	communities	in	question	will	never	give	up	in	relevant	situations,	then	it	can	prove	difficult	to	integrate	the	knowledge	systems	in	a	way	that	would	both	satisfy	the	indigenous	participants	and	meet	the	criteria	formulated	by	Longino.	Moreover,	there	are	other	cases	in	which	similar	issues	are	at	stake.	For	example,	according	to	Linda	Tuhiwai	Smith,	"Maori	society	valued	knowledge	highly,	to	such	an	extent	that	certain	types	of	knowledge	were	entrusted	only	to	a	few	members	of	the	whanau"	(Smith	1999,	172).	If	this	kind	of	secrecy	is	indeed	an	essential	part	of	the	Maori	knowledge	system,	and	if	it	has	to	be	preserved	in	situations	when	Maori	knowledge	is	to	be	integrated	with	academic	knowledge,	the	social-epistemic	practices	of	the	resulting	epistemic	community	are	not	likely	to	meet	Longino's	criteria.	It	is	in	the	nature	of	a	secret	that	it	cannot	meet	with	effective	outside	criticism.	In	other	words,	the	attempted	integration	would	result	in	threatening	the	objectivity	of	the	research	community.	Now	we	know	that	in	actual	scientific	practice	information	disclosure	is	not	perfect,	and	we	know	that	epistemic	authority	is	not	evenly	distributed.	Yet	we	agree	with	Longino	in	that	perfect	information	disclosure	is	an	ideal	to	be	pursued	and	that	epistemic	authority	is	to	be	based	on	prior	scientific	achievements	and	not	to	be	accepted	on	epistemically	irrelevant	grounds.	Therefore,	if	an	extra-academic	knowledge	system	includes	generally	approved	practices	such	as	determining	epistemic	authority	according	to	the	speaker’s	age,	or	concealing	certain	types	of	knowledge	because	of	their	spiritual	(or,	say,	commercial)	value,	and	if	these	practices	are	inseparable	parts	of	wholistic	epistemic	systems	–	then	it	is	unfeasible	to	integrate	these	systems	with	academic	knowledge.		
5.	Conclusion:	What	extra-academic	transdisciplinarity	and	scientific	
pluralism	might	learn	from	one	another?	
																																																								5	As	to	how	significant	a	problem	"gaining	the	permission	of	the	spirits	of	the	land"	is,	depends	on	what	exactly	it	amounts	to.	If	it	is	for	instance	comparable	to	prayer,	and	participation	is	optional,	it	might	not	jeoprdise	the	objectivity	of	the	research	community.	On	the	other	hand,	if	there	are	specific	people	in	the	community	who	have	the	power	to	determine	whether	the	permission	of	the	spirits	has	been	achieved	or	not,	it	is	inconsistent	whith	the	criterion	of	tempered	equality	(Longino	2002).	
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The	non-philosophical	literature	on	TD	appears	to	be	overly	optimistic.	We	have	argued	that	several	ideas	developed	within	pluralist	philosophies	of	science	have	the	potential	of	being	of	use	when	analysing	problems	and	challenges	presently	passed	over	in	this	over-optimistic	literature.	Attempts	to	integrate	diverse	knowledge	systems	often	fail,	and	they	may	fail	in	a	variety	of	ways.	Sometimes	problems	in	integration	can	be	solved	through	mutual	learning	and	deliberation,	if	given	enough	time,	but	this	is	not	at	all	always	so.	This	may	be	because	scientific	knowledge	systems	are	theoretically	incompatible,	at	least	presently.	The	integration	of	academic	knowledge	systems	with	extra-academic	knowledge	systems	can	fail	if	the	respective	epistemic	communities	have	inflexible	conflicting	epistemic	values	and	norms	that	may	be	embedded	in	social-epistemic	practices.	The	strong	pressure	on	TD	projects	to	rapidly	generate	integration	may	result	in	pseudo-integration	and	thereby	jeopardise	the	reliability	of	the	outputs	of	such	projects.	Moreover,	the	absence	of	operational	peer	communities	and	agreed-upon	standards	for	evaluation	makes	the	detection	of	such	shortcomings	difficult.	The	notion	of	knowledge	systems	used	in	the	TD	literature	resembles	the	anthropological	notion	developed	for	purposes	in	relation	to	which	normative	epistemic	assessment	is	generally	avoided.	In	discussions	on	extra-academic	TD	the	concept	is	however	used	in	contexts	where	normative	epistemic	assessment	is	indispensable	and	the	epistemic	norms	and	values	of	the	different	epistemic	communities	may	be	found	to	conflict	with	each	other.	If	knowledge	systems	are	to	be	integrated,	they	must	be	critically	assessed.	Combined	with	the	optimistic	idea	that	integration	is	to	happen	through	mutual	learning	and	deliberation,	this	notion	of	knowledge	systems	may	result	in	decreased	objectivity	of	research	communities.	More	interaction	between	the	two	broad	bodies	of	literature	would	be	welcome.	This	could	prove	useful	for	the	development	of	socially	inclusive	research	practices,	and	for	the	ongoing	discussions	of	the	roles	that	local	communities,	businesses,	NGOs,	indigenous	people	and	others	might	play	in	scientific	research.	We	suggest	that	pluralist	philosophers	of	science	sympathetic	to	some	of	the	aims	of	TD	would	look	more	closely	at	actual	TD	research	and	the	complex	settings	in	which	extra-academic	collaboration	and	participation	happen.	It	is	important	for	progress	in	(our	assessment	of)	extra-academic	TD	that	it	receives	philosophical	attention	that	recognises	what	is	valuable	in	it,	and	that	is	capable	of	offering	constructive	criticism.	The	pluralist	reasoning	about	extra-academic	participation	could	do	more	than	just	concentrate	on	arguing	why	it	is	important	to	give	extra-academic	agents	a	role	in	academic	research.	It	is	equally	important	to	ask	how	to	do	it	well.		
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